


AIRPROX REPORT No 2015165

Date: 27 Sep 2015 Time: 1059Z Position: 5055N 00147W Location: Fordingbridge

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	PA28
Operator	Civ Trg	Civ Pte
Airspace	Lon FIR	Lon FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Basic
Provider	Bournemouth	Bournemouth
Altitude/FL	FL014	NK
Transponder	A,C,S	A,C
Reported		
Colours	White, Red	White, Blue
Lighting	Strobes, Beacon	Nil
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	20km	>10km
Altitude/FL	2000ft	1800ft
Altimeter	QNH (1032hPa)	NK
Heading	120°	285°
Speed	100kt	130kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
Separation		
Reported	0ft V/600m H	0ft V/400m H
Recorded		NK V/0.1nm H



THE PA28 (A) PILOT reports that he was supervising a student on a navex. The student was trying to confirm that they were overhead Fordingbridge when the instructor saw another aircraft head-on, at short range, about 1km away. He immediately took control took avoiding action, needing 90° AOB, full-power and 180° turn to the right. On levelling the aircraft, the other aircraft was seen to be right-abeam on a parallel course and at the same altitude. The aircraft seemed to be levelling its wings by rolling left.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE PA28 (B) PILOT reports that he was overhead Fordingbridge when he saw an aircraft in his 10 o'clock, the aircraft appeared to be performing steep turns (later realised to be avoiding action). He turned 30° right to keep clear, but not further as he assessed that there was no risk of collision at that point. He called Bournemouth to tell them about the PA28 performing 'steep turns'.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

Factual Background

The weather at Bournemouth was recorded as follows:

METAR EGHH 271050Z 09011KT 9999 SCT028 17/10 Q1032=

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

Both aircraft were receiving a Basic Service from Bournemouth Radar, and were transponding Bournemouth Radar Conspicuity code 7377. Neither aircraft was formerly identified by the Bournemouth Radar controller.

CPA took place at 1059:52, with PA28 (A) indicating FL014 which is the equivalent of an altitude of 1810ft on the Bournemouth QNH 1032. The PA28 (B) pilot reported their altitude as 1800ft (Figure 1). PA28 (A) was then seen to complete a substantial turn to the right, which matched both pilot reports (Figure 2).

The PA28 (B) pilot reported seeing PA28 (A), and made a right turn of 30°, but due to the turn completed by the PA28 (A), did not consider there to be a risk of collision. The pilot of the PA28 (B) reported not realising at the time that the turn completed by the other aircraft was an avoiding-action turn, but did report the fact that a PA28 (A) was performing steep turns in their position to Bournemouth ATC.

Neither pilot reported the Airprox to Bournemouth ATC, and so no official report was filed by them. Bournemouth ATC did state, when asked about the incident by ATSI, that the period in question was “extremely busy”. The controller was providing a Basic Service to a number of aircraft, as well as a radar service to an aircraft conducting instrument training at Bournemouth.



Figure 1 – CPA – 1059:52

Figure 2 – 1100:23

A Basic Service relies on the pilot avoiding other traffic, unaided by controllers/FISOs. The provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight and pilots should not expect any form of traffic information from a controller/FISO¹.

UKAB Secretariat

Both PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard². If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right³, which they did.

¹ CAP774, Chapter 2, Para 2.1 & 2.5

² SERA.3205 Proximity.

³ SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c) (1) Approaching head-on.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when two PA28s flew into proximity at 1059 on Sunday 27th September 2015. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, and both pilots were receiving a Basic Service from Bournemouth.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft, radar photographs/video recordings, and reports from the appropriate ATC operating authorities.

The Board noted that this was a busy area for which, during week-days, Boscombe Down would normally provide the LARS service; at weekends, it fell to Bournemouth to pick up the LARS tasking depending on controller capacity. Noting that both pilots were on the same frequency, the Board initially wondered whether there had been any opportunity for each to have heard the other making position reports, although they recognised that this would be highly dependent on their relative positions and whether any calls had in fact been made. Furthermore, and notwithstanding the fact that Bournemouth ATC were seemingly busy at the time, given that both aircraft were wearing a Bournemouth squawk, the Board also wondered whether there had been any opportunity for the controller to pass generic traffic information to the pilots on their initial call when they reported their position and routing, even without formally identifying the aircraft. Continuing the debate about the potential for receiving assistance from ATC, some members also wondered whether the pilots could have asked for a Traffic Service, which could then have provided them with specific Traffic Information depending on controller workload. However, without a controller report, the Board were not able to assess any of these possibilities, and this highlighted the value of reporting an Airprox on frequency; had this happened at the time, the controller would have been aware of the incident and would have recorded the incident details and his ability to assist. As it was, Bournemouth were not made aware until some weeks afterwards, and vital information was therefore lost.

Ultimately, the Board noted that both pilots were flying in Class G airspace with see-and-avoid as the main mitigation against mid-air collision. GA members opined that Fordingbridge is a popular routing point in the area, and this incident highlighted the need to be vigilant when transiting along known local navigation and training routes. They commented that PA28 (A) was on a training flight, and that it was likely that the instructor was helping the student with his navigational techniques when he looked up and was surprised by the proximity of the other aircraft. Members observed that this 'startle factor' often causes pilots to perceive the other aircraft as closer than it really is, and might account for the pilot's perception that he needed to take quite drastic avoiding action. In contrast, they noted that the PA28 (B) pilot saw the other aircraft after it had started to turn away, and thought that a much less energetic turn was necessary.

The Board noted that PA28 (B) did not have Mode C displayed and wondered why this was the case. Although it probably didn't materially affect this Airprox, the presence of Mode C assists other pilots in detecting potential conflicts through the use of such aids as TAS/P-FLARM if they are fitted. It also assists controllers in giving Traffic Information to other aircraft on a Traffic Service. They commented that pilots should be aware that by not using Mode C they were effectively denying other airspace users another highly effective method of detecting (and therefore avoiding) them.

Turning to the cause of the Airprox, the Board quickly agreed that this was a conflict in Class G that had been resolved by both pilots. They considered that both pilots had seen the other aircraft in sufficient time to take timely and effective avoiding action, so the risk was assessed as Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A conflict in Class G resolved by both pilots.

Degree of Risk: C.